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Abstract. The Constitution comprises general clauses and notions whose meaning it does not specify in detail−and 
this meaning can be established by Constitutional Court. In the Polish doctrine of Constitutional law, opinions 
about the legal status of the Preamble are diversiﬁ ed. The dominant view in the contemporary doctrine of 
Constitutional law is that the Preamble has a normative character. The Constitutional Court has many times drawn 
upon the provisions of the Preamble in its rulings. The provisions of the Preamble dealing with Constitutional 
principles and values form a “bridge” between natural law and positivist law, which may be conducive to a fuller 
protection of human rights in the state, and consequently a better operation of Constitutional democracy. But the 
higher the frequency of principle- and value-invoking notions in the Constitutional text (usually in the Preamble), 
the greater and the more real is the authority of those who interpret these notions−and impart sense to them−in 
conditions of a particular constitutional dispute.
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1. The jurisprudence of values has an important role to play in interpreting the Constitution 
in the legal culture of a democratic state ruled by law.1 The Constitution comprises general 
clauses and notions whose meaning it does not specify in detail−and this meaning can be 
established in the light of principles and values set out in the Preamble to the Constitution. 
2. The opening statements of the Polish Constitution2 deﬁ ne the axiological identity of 
Constitutional democracy and they identify the system’s underlying principles, including 
some which are mentioned only in the Preamble and not elsewhere in the Constitution (such 
as subsidiarity).
3. In the Polish doctrine of Constitutional law, opinions about the legal status of the 
Preamble are diversiﬁ ed. 
The normative importance of the Constitution lies in that its particular provision may 
serve as a benchmark, a point of reference in respect of “norms, principles and values”. All 
this holds for the Preamble, too. The dominant view in the contemporary doctrine of 
Constitutional law is that the Preamble has a normative character. An opinion expressed in 
literature on the subject posits that “irrespective of its speciﬁ c features, the Constitution’s 
introductory part indeed has a normative character. It also plays an important role in 
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1 Values make possible a grounding “in the post-modern law−fuzzy and indeterminate, 
polycentric and multilayered as it is”. See Giaro, T.: Wartości w języku prawnym i dyskursie 
prawniczym (Values in legal language and discourse). In: Trybunał Konstytucyjny: Preambuła 
Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (Constitutional Court: Preamble to the Polish Constitution). 
Warszawa, 2009, 15.
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mapping out the lines of interpretation of the basic law’s individual norms. And in addition, 
it serves for the Constitution to perform other-than-legal functions, such as integration or 
public education”.3 It is also argued that an assessment of the Preamble’s normative 
character must always be made in respect of a particular Constitution, and that this 
assessment does not have to be the same for all provisions of the Preamble. It is pointed out 
in literature that a tendency towards “normativation” of Constitutional preambles is 
inevitable within the framework of  statutory law, where the Constitution is the fundamental 
legal act of the highest import−and this also applies to the Preamble as an integral part the 
Constitution.4 
In the past, it was asserted that “the Constitution’s opening remarks are its integral 
part; and the different manner in which these are formulated … does not sufﬁ ce to conclude 
that the framers of the Constitution wanted to deprive the Preamble of its normative 
character”.5 The view was also presented that the Preamble−even if being of a normative 
character, as part of the Constitution−may also include parts of propagandist and political 
nature, or formulations serving as pointers to interpret the entirety of Constitutional 
provisions.6 According to yet another opinion, the fact that the Preamble is part of the 
Constitution does not necessarily determine the legal status of its provisions.7 And A. 
Gwiżdż claimed that individual sentences in the Constitution’s introductory part “take on a 
normative character”.8
According to theorists of law, the Preamble is not of an obligatory nature and as such it 
does not contain norms which would bind an interpreter of the Constitution.9 And in the 
more recent literature on the theory of law, we can ﬁ nd the opinion that “the texts of 
Preambles do not contain material from which to directly construct legal norms” and that 
preambles “should rather serve as an aid to be drawn for the purpose of interpretation, and 
especially when applying the articles laid down in the normative acts to which these 
preambles are attached.”10
Nowadays, it is proposed in the doctrine of Constitutional law that Preamble provisions 
should be divided into those “of a normative character” which “themselves form a legal 
norm or a major part of such norm”, and those which do not meet this condition and as such 
3 See Banaszak, B.: Prawo konstytucyjne porównawcze współczesnych państw demokratycznych 
(Comparative Constitutional law of modern democratic states). Kraków, 2004, 130. 
4 Cf. Jamróz, A. In: Prawo. Administracja. Obywatele (Law. Administration. Citizens). 
Białystok, 1997, 107.
5 Cf. Rozmaryn, S.: Konstytucja jako ustawa zasadnicza PRL (Constitution as the basic law of 
the Polish People’s Republic). Warszawa, 1967, 61.
6 Cf. Burda, A.: Polskie prawo państwowe (Polish Constitutional law). Warszawa, 1977, 158. 
7 Cf. Siemieński, F.: Prawo konstytucyjne (Constitutional law). Warszawa–Poznań, 1980, 30.
8 Cf. Gwiżdż, A.: Wstęp do konstytucji–zagadnienia prawne (Constitutional Preamble–legal 
aspects). In: Trzciński, J. (ed.): Charakter i struktura norm konstytucji (Nature and structure of 
Constitutional norms). Warszawa, 1997, 183. Cf. also Bałaban, A.: Prawny charakter wstępu do 
polskiej Konstytucji z 2 kwietnia 1997 roku (The legal character of the Preamble to Polish Constitution 
of 2 April 1997). In: Kudej, M. (ed.): W kręgu zagadnień konstytucyjnych (Around Constitutional 
issues). Katowice, 1999, 120. 
9 Cf. Lewandowski, S.: Kontrowersje wokół preambuł (Controversies over Preambles). Studia 
Iuridica, (1996) 31, 88.
10 Cf. Jabłońska-Bonca, J.: Wstęp do nauk prawnych (Introduction to Legal Sciences). Gdańsk, 
1992, 89.
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are of “normative importance”.11 According to Constitutional interpreters,12 the following 
dimensions of a Preamble’s normative nature should be differentiated: 
1. interpretative dimension–the provisions belonging in this dimension “indicate how 
other Constitutional provisions, and all provisions in the entire body of Polish law, should 
be understood”. This dimension embraces all provisions of the Preamble, which formulates 
the axiological foundation of the Constitutional order and which speciﬁ es the direction 
along which detailed provisions should be interpreted; 
2. constructional dimension–the provisions of the Preamble belonging in this 
dimension may be used in the construction of Constitutional norms, by deriving elements of 
the constructed norm from these provisions. According to L. Garlicki, only some provisions 
of the Preamble may be handled in this way. But it is “almost always” that the Preamble 
and other Constitutional provisions are applied jointly, because “almost always” a principle 
formulated in the Preamble is enlarged upon or repeated in the articles of the Constitution. 
The normative importance of Preamble provisions may consist in that they express on their 
own a Constitutional principle of a normative character (subsidiarity principle).13
4. The Constitutional Court has many times drawn upon the provisions of the Preamble in 
its rulings.14
The Constitutional Court said: “Freedom, justice, cooperation and dialogue−these are 
among the values clearly expressed in the preamble to the Constitution of 1997, which must 
be used as criteria in assessing any activities by the public authorities, including the 
legislative activity aiming to realise the principle of a democratic state, ruled by law and 
implementing the tenets of social justice. These requirements unequivocally invoke the so-
called material understanding of the rule of law, and they categorically rule out arbitrary 
law-making” (memorandum of explanation to ruling in case K 34/97). 
Given the Preamble’s provision which counts “truth, justice, good and beauty” among 
“universal values”, the Constitutional Court said: “The notion of truth is a normative one, 
and not only purely factual. This can be seen in the wording of the Constitution itself. The 
framers of the Constitution refer in the Preamble to truth as a universal value upon which 
the system of government of the Republic is founded” (memorandum of explanation to 
ruling in case SK 13/05).
In the memorandum of explanation to its ruling in case K 20/00, asserting the 
constitutionality of a provision in the Environment Act,15 the Constitutional Court pointed 
out that “the Preamble to the Constitution lists among an individual’s basic obligations the 
obligation of solidarity with others”, which is further ﬂ eshed out in Art. 20 of the 
Constitution. According to the Constitutional Court, “the arrangements introduced under 
11 Cf. L. Garlicki’s comments on the Preamble. In: Garlicki, L. (ed.): Konstytucja RP. Komentarz 
(Polish Constitution. A commentary). Warszawa, Vol. V, 2.
12 Cf. Garlicki: op. cit. 18.
13 Ibid.
14 Stefaniuk, M.: Preambuła do Konstytucji RP z 2 kwietnia 1997 roku w orzecznictwie 
Trybunału Konstytucyjnego (Preamble to Polish Constitution of 2 April 1997 in jurisprudence of the 
Constitutional Tribunal). Annales UMCS, 2003/2004. Constitutional Court rulings are posted online at 
www.trybunal.gov.pl
15 Uniform text in Dziennik Ustaw (Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland) of 1994, No. 49, 
item 196, as amended.
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the referred provision do serve the implementation of the Constitutional principle of 
solidarity of citizens living in different municipalities”.  
Citing the Preamble’s provision about the “need for cooperation with all countries for 
the good of the Human Family”, the Constitutional Court found that the “interpretation of 
the law of the country should take into account the Constitutional principle of favourable 
attitude towards the process of European integration and cooperation among states (cf. 
Preamble and Art. 9 of the Constitution). Interpreting the law in a way which serves the 
implementation of this Constitutional principle is correct in Constitutional terms and 
preferable” (memorandum of explanation to verdict in case K 11/03).
In some of its rulings, the Constitutional Court not only cites the provisions of the 
Preamble, but it also makes direct use of the Preamble by afﬁ rming a compliance of the 
referred regulation with the provisions of the Preamble. In such instances, the Preamble, 
cited by the plaintiff as part of the benchmark of Constitutional control, is referred to by 
name in the text of the ruling. 
And so, when assessing the conformity of Poland’s Europe Agreement and the 
Accession Terms Act with the values indicated in the Constitutional Preamble, the 
Constitutional Court analysed the signiﬁ cance of the Preamble (case K 18/04). In the 
opinion of the Constitutional Court, the Preamble “contains a characterisation of Poland’s 
system-of-government pathway, emphasising the universal pro-independence and 
democratic experiences and pointing to the universal Constitutional values and to the 
underlying principles organising the life of community living in the state, such as democracy, 
respect for human rights, cooperation between the public powers, social dialogue and the 
principle of subsidiarity”. Simultaneously, the Constitutional Court said, these values and 
the principle of subsidiarity, are among the underlying foundations of the European 
Communities and the European Union–and this remains relevant for the fundamental 
European values indicated in the Treaty of Lisbon.  
In the memorandum of explanation to its ruling in case K 18/04, the Constitutional 
Court stated that legal norms sensu stricto cannot be derived from the text of the 
Constitutional Preamble. What the Preamble does provide are “indications, based on the 
Constitution framers’ authentic pronouncement, of the lines along which to interpret the 
provisions of the Constitution’s normative part, these lines of interpretation being in 
compliance with the intentions of the framers of the Constitution”. According to the 
Constitutional Court, the Preamble also retains such status with regard to the benchmarks of 
Constitutional control indicted by the plaintiffs in case K 18/04. This translates into seeing 
to it that in the process of European integration there is “concern about a sovereign and 
democratic determination of the present and future existence of the Homeland and about 
guarantees of civil rights as well as the efﬁ ciency and diligence in the work of public 
bodies” (memorandum of explanation in case  K 18/04). An opinion has been expressed in 
the Polish doctrine of Constitutional law that the statement of the Constitutional Court 
“legal norms sensu stricto cannot be derived from the text of the Constitutional Preamble” 
means in fact that “certain parts of the Constitution cannot be presented in the form of a 
traditionally understood legal norm”.16
The Constitutional Court is currently examining motions from Sejm Deputies and 
Senators about the compliance of certain provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon with the 
16 Garlicki, L.: Uwagi do wstępu (Comments on the Preamble). In: Garlicki, L. (ed.): Konstytucja 
RP. Komentarz (Polish Constitution. A commentary). Warszawa, Vol. V, 20.
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provisions of the Preamble on the sovereign and democratic determination of the fate of the 
Homeland. The provisions of the Preamble deﬁ ning the axiological identity of Poland and 
the European Union may, therefore, play an important role legitimising Poland’s membership 
of the European Union. 
When ruling on a competences dispute between the Polish President and the Prime 
Minister  as to which of the state’s central Constitutional bodies is authorised to represent 
the Republic of Poland and communicate the position of the state at meetings of the 
European Council, the Constitutional Court based its ruling on the Preamble. It found that 
in discharging their Constitutional duties and competences, the Polish President, the Council 
of Ministers and the Prime Minister are guided by the principle of cooperation between the 
public powers, as laid down in the Preamble and Art. 133.3 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Poland (memorandum of explanation in case Kpt 2/08).
The Constitutional Court has ruled on the compliance of a referred regulation with the 
provisions of the Preamble in a case involving the understanding of the subsidiarity 
principle, whose binding nature is recognised only in court jurisprudence. In the Constitution, 
that principle is only laid down in the Preamble.   
And so, for example, in its ruling in case U 5/04, the Constitutional Court found the 
Council of Ministers’ regulation on border delineation and change of name and seat of 
authority for some municipalities and towns and on raising to township the status of some 
localities17 is in compliance with the Preamble to the Polish Constitution to the extent where 
the Preamble cites the principles of cooperation between the public powers, social dialogue 
and subsidiarity.
The signiﬁ cance of the subsidiarity principle was taken up by the Constitutional Court 
in the memorandum of explanation to its ruling on case K 24/02. The Constitutional Court 
then said that the principle of subsidiarity, deﬁ ned in the Preamble as one which strengthens 
the powers of citizens and their communities, “warrants the taking of activities at a higher-
than-local level where such an arrangement turns out to be better and more effective than 
the activities of bodies of local-level communities. The subsidiarity principle should be 
viewed in all its complexity, which means that the strengthening of citizen and local-
community powers does not mean abandoning above-local activities by public authorities. 
Such activities are actually a must where it is not possible for the local-level bodies to solve 
problems.” 
In its ruling in case K 14/03, the Constitutional Court said that the “diligence and 
efﬁ ciency of public bodies, and especially those public bodies, which have been created to 
implement and protect the rights guaranteed by the Constitution, is among the values of 
Constitutional  importance”. This, in the opinion of the Constitutional Court, “clearly results 
from the text” of the Preamble, which “lists the two main objectives of the Constitution: 
guarantying civil rights and ensuring diligence and efﬁ ciency in the work of public 
bodies”.
The Court therefore may examine “whether the regulations on the activity of these 
institutions are so designed as to enable their diligent and efﬁ cient operation. A regulation 
whose design is not conducive to the diligence or efﬁ ciency of institutions protecting the 
Constitutional rights actually represents a violation of these rights, and it is therefore 
warranted to declare it unconstitutional”. A similar opinion was expressed by the 
Constitutional Court in the memorandum of explanation to its ruling in case K 20/00.
17 Dziennik Ustaw of 2003, No. 134, item 1248.
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In case K 54/05, the Constitutional Court ruled that a provision in the Spatial Planning 
and Development Act18 complies with the Preamble to the Polish Constitution to the extent, 
where this Preamble expresses the principle of cooperation between the public powers, the 
subsidiarity principle and the requirement of efﬁ ciency and diligence of the public bodies. 
In its ruling in case K 31/06 Constitutional Court attested to the constitutionality of the 
whole Act of 6 September 2006 amending the rules governing elections to municipality 
councils, county councils, and regional assemblies.19 The principle of diligence and 
efﬁ ciency in the work of public bodies, espoused in the Preamble, was used by the 
Constitutional Court as a benchmark of Constitutional control of the referred regulations.
The jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court also includes the opinion that the charge 
of Preamble violation by a normative act on the basis of which a ﬁ nal ruling has been 
issued about Constitutionally deﬁ ned rights, freedoms and obligations must not by itself 
provide a basis for Constitutional complaint. The Constitutional Court said so in the 
memorandum of explanation to its ruling in case SK 10/03: “The Constitutional complaint 
is warranted only where Constitutional freedoms or rights have been violated, and only 
where the violation comes as a result of unconstitutionality of the normative act on the 
basis of which the ﬁ nal judgment, injuring the plaintiff, was issued. Therefore, not every 
Constitutional provision may serve as a benchmark of Constitutional control in a proceeding 
launched in response to a complaint”. Consequently, among benchmarks in a Constitutional 
complaint proceeding, “the Preamble to the Constitution must be ruled out because−leaving 
out doubts about its normative character−it certainly does not comprise norms from which 
arise freedoms and rights” (memorandum of explanation in case  SK 10/03). It is thus 
inadmissible for the Constitutional Court, acting in response to a Constitutional complaint, 
to rule on the referred regulations’ compliance with the Preamble to the Constitution. 
The issue looks a bit differently in the light of the Constitutional Court’s ruling in a 
constitutional-complaint case SK 39/06. The complaint pointed to the Preamble as a 
benchmark of Constitutional control, and the Constitutional Court found in its response that 
the “Preamble is part of the Constitution, and its pronouncements may be of a normative 
character, in the context of a given case and especially in connection with particular 
provisions of the Constitution”. However, the Constitutional Court went on, “the plaintiff 
did not indicate the relevant pronouncements of the Preamble and, consequently, did not 
indicate the norms which could be constructed on the basis of such pronouncements. Nor 
did the plaintiff indicate which civil-law right was violated as a result”.
But the part of the Preamble evoking the times “when fundamental freedoms and 
human rights were violated in our Homeland” was actually cited by the Constitutional Court 
in explaining its ruling in constitutional-complaint case SK 42/01. It found then that the 
“negative identiﬁ cation of a group of judges” (deprived of a retirement right), who have 
“worked for, or served in, the security services, and their separation from other judges, 
shows no signs of arbitrariness and complies with the principle of fairness. For this reason, 
it is relevant to characterise people holding the ofﬁ ce of judge as participating in the 
apparatus of repression in the indicated period. Consequently it is acceptable, perhaps even 
advisable, (…) that these persons be not treated as equal with the other judges, who did not 
embark on such work for, or collaboration with, the security apparatus”. In the opinion of 
18 Dziennik Ustaw of 2003, No. 80, item 717, as amended. 
19 Dziennik Ustaw No. 159, item 1127.
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the Constitutional Court, such reasoning is premised on the indicated part of the Preamble 
to the Constitution.
In its ruling in case Kp 5/08, the Constitutional Court found a particular provision of 
the Act of 4 September 2008 amending the passport act and the stamp fee act to be in 
compliance with the Preamble. The ruling, in a way, sums up the opinions presented in 
earlier rulings and the doctrine of Constitutional law. 
In its memorandum of explanation in case Kp 5/08, the Constitutional Court recalled that 
“doubts exist as to the normative character of the Preamble to the fundamental law”. In the 
opinion of the Constitutional Court, these doubts “result from the circumstance that it is not 
possible to derive legal norms sensu stricto from the text of this Preamble”. But on the other 
hand, “the introductory part of the Constitution of 1997 contains a characterisation of Poland’s 
system-of-government pathway, emphasising the universal the pro-independence and 
democratic experiences and pointing to the universal Constitutional values and to the 
underlying principles organising the life of the community living in the state, such as 
democracy, respect for human rights, cooperation between the public powers, social 
dialogue and the principle of subsidiarity”. The Constitutional Court further said that “in 
the light of the most recent Constitutional doctrine, this sufﬁ ces to recognise the normative 
character of the Preamble to the Constitution”. In the opinion of the Constitutional Court, 
“a tendency towards ‘normatisation’ of Constitutional preambles is inevitable within the 
framework of statutory law, where the Constitution is the fundamental legal act of the 
highest import−and this also applies to the Preamble as an integral part the Constitution”.
5. The Constitutional Court has often cited Preamble provisions in its rulings. In particular, 
the Court checked the compliance of particular regulations with the provisions of the 
Preamble, these provisions constituting for the Court a benchmark by which to control the 
referred regulations. In other rulings, the Court cited the Preamble when “supplementing 
arguments with regard to the assessment of norms with other benchmarks, contained in 
articles of the Constitution” (memorandum of explanation in case Kp 5/08). That was about 
the provisions of the Preamble, especially those concerning the sovereignty of the Polish 
People, the cooperation between the public powers, subsidiarity, and also diligence and 
efﬁ ciency in the work of public bodies.
It looks like the Preamble, which largely found itself in the Constitution in order to 
emphasise the continuation of Constitutional tradition,20 has been gradually gaining in 
importance in the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence as material to construct Constitutional 
principles and norms, in search of solutions to major problems related to the system of 
governance.
Constitutional commentators point out that the Preamble “provides an important clue 
to interpreting the provisions of the act which it opens”. According to representatives of 
doctrine, “a modern constitutional court cannot adjudicate without invoking various kinds 
of values. And their largest collection is provided in the opening credits to fundamental 
laws. In addition to stating the overarching ideas and underlying principles, the Constitutional 
Preamble also expresses the framers’ other statements of the most important points of law”. 
20 See Stefaniuk, M. E.: Tradycje preambuł w polskich konstytucjach i ich wpływ na rozwiązania 
współczesne (Traditions of Polish Constitutional Preambles and their inﬂ uence on modern 
arrangements). In: Witkowski, W. (ed.): W kręgu historii i współczesności polskiego prawa (The past 
and present of Polish law). Lublin, 2008, 696.
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If the Preamble were ignored in Constitutional Court rulings, this would “put in question 
the legality and correctness of the decisions taken. Without steadily taking note of the 
Constitution’s opening part, these decisions would be ﬂ awed and would fail to reﬂ ect in full 
the rich contents of the Polish supreme law. (…) A progressing juridisation of the whole 
Constitutional text stands in contradiction to the opinions regarding the introductory part as 
just an ideological and political declaration.”21
By invoking provisions of the Preamble, it is easier to ﬁ nd rules legitimising the country’s 
membership of the European Union−and this is also conducive to a polycentric system of 
sources of law. It transpires from the Preamble that the Constitution should be understood and 
applied in conformity with a common European tradition, while respecting national sovereignty 
and identity. The provisions of the Preamble dealing with Constitutional principles and values 
form a “bridge” between natural law and positivist law, which may be conducive to a fuller 
protection of human rights in the state, and consequently a better operation of Constitutional 
democracy.
From this viewpoint, how Preamble is understood may also serve to strengthen 
the capacity to defend the Constitution against hypothetical changes contradicting its 
function of human rights’ guarantee and, consequently, compromising the tenets of 
constitutionalism.
For the Constitution to be understood in a way commensurate with the constitutionalist 
approach, one ﬁ rst needs to assume that the authorities should be constrained by human 
rights.22 Thus, the public authorities, even if backed by a majority, cannot just do 
“anything”23−even if they observe the rules laid down in the text of the Constitution. In 
particular, the constitutionalist approach contests the opinion that we enjoy human rights 
because they are inscribed in the Constitution. On the contrary, they are inscribed in the 
Constitution because they are human rights. This means that not all provisions of the 
fundamental law can be changed without risking that it will lose features of a Constitution. 
Constitutionalism is opposed by theories of Constitution which posit that by observing the 
relevant procedural requirements, it is possible to arbitrarily determine the contents of the 
fundamental law.24
The injunction to respect “the inherent dignity of the person, his or her right to freedom 
and the obligation of solidarity with others” is described in the Preamble to the Constitution 
as “the unshakeable foundation of the Republic of Poland”. The way in which the 
Constitution is applied must rest of a foundation of principles, not on ﬂ uctuating political 
conﬁ gurations reﬂ ecting election results. A serious approach to the Constitution requires 
that we notice the special signiﬁ cance of the Preamble’s conclusive part. Having regained 
the possibility of a sovereign and democratic determination of Homeland’s fate, we now bar 
the authority−including a majority-backed authority−from legitimising violations of the 
state’s axiological foundations. These foundations must remain “inviolable”, meaning 
“resistant to being revised, undermined, moved or overturned”.25 In this way, the Preamble 
deﬁ nes the limits of legitimate authority, including the authority to revise the Constitution. 
21 See Boć, J.: Konstytucje Rzeczypospolitej oraz komentarz do Konstytucji RP z 1997 r. (Polish 
Constitutions and comment on the Constitution of 1997). Wrocław, 1998, 12.
22 See Murphy, W.: Constitutional Democracy: Creating and Maintaining a Just Political 
Order. Baltimore, 2007, 6.
23 Cf. Memorandum of explanation of Constitutional Court ruling in case U 4/06.
24 Cf. Murphy: op. cit. 15.
25 See Dunaj, B. (ed.): Słownik współczesnego języka polskiego (Modern Polish Dictionary). 
Warszawa, 1996, 616.
37THE IMPORTANCE OF PREAMBLE IN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT JURISPRUDENCE
And it is precisely through the prism of Preamble provisions that we should understand 
the rules governing Constitutional change, as provided in Chapter XII. That chapter contains 
procedural provisions which take on a substantive importance precisely due to the Preamble 
which serves as an “important axiological clue in the process of interpreting other 
Constitutional provisions, as phrased in individual articles”.26 Chapter XII does not set the 
limits to change, because it deals with procedure. It is in the introductory part that the limits 
are deﬁ ned (in the form of “unshakeable foundation”), the principles are named which must 
not be breached, and the overriding objective to be sought by the changes is indicated: “the 
good of the Third Republic.” Other objectives are ruled out by the Preamble, which thus 
constrains the authority wielded by a majority capable of bringing about changes in 
accordance with the procedure deﬁ ned by the Constitution.27
The obligation to respect the provisions of the Preamble rests upon all those who apply 
the Constitution, including the Constitutional Court, in all its functions. Now, if we accept 
that the Constitution must not infringe “the inherent dignity of the person, his or her right to 
freedom and the obligation of solidarity with others”, it remains to be explained who 
else−other than the legislators and the electorate−shoulders the responsibility for the 
observance of these principles and values. Given the Preamble’s closing passage, where 
respect for principles is described as the unshakeable foundation of the state, one could 
hardly rule out an extension of the Constitutional Court’s terms of reference to embrace the 
content of Constitution-revising statutes−precisely from the viewpoint of those principles 
and values which are described in the Preamble as “unshakeable”. As has been pointed out 
in doctrine, the Constitutional Court may examine the constitutionality of Constitution-
revising procedure as part of preventive control28 (exercised before a Constitution-changing 
statute is signed by the president). But if such examination is accepted as part of ex ante 
control, this means that we recognise the Court’s competence to make pronouncements on 
Constitution revising laws. It is my belief that the terms of reference of the Constitutional 
Court may include the control of such statutes (both ex ante and ex post) not only in its 
procedural aspect but also in the material aspect−precisely because of the Preamble’s 
closing part. Supporting this position is the speciﬁ c nature of the Constitutional Revision 
Act, remembering that the Constitution−strictly speaking−is not a new constitution but 
rather a statue revising the existing constitution. In a situation, where its is found acceptable 
to examine the constitutionality of a statute ceding state bodies’ competences in some 
matters to an international body or organisation−even though the passage of such statute 
requires special procedure in both chambers (including the requirement of two-thirds 
majority in both chambers)−, then constitutional control of a Constitution-revising statute 
no longer looks out-of-the-question from the viewpoint of procedural requirements. If a 
statute approving the previously mentioned cession of competences comes within the terms 
of reference of the Constitutional Court−as deﬁ ned by the notion of “statute” in Art. 188 of 
the Constitution29−then a “Constitution-revising statute” may likely come within these terms 
26 See Garlicki, L.: Polskie prawo konstytucyjne (Polish Constitutional law). Warszawa, 2009, 42.
27 Cf. Piotrowski, R.: Preambuła i zagadnienie granic zmian w Konstytucji RP (The Preamble 
and the question of limits to revision of Polish Constitution). In: Trybunał Konstytucyjny, Preambuła 
Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskie. Warszawa, 2009, 139.
28 Cf. W. Sokolewicz’s comments on Art. 235 of Polish Constitution. In: Garlicki, L. (ed.): 
Konstytucja RP. Komentarz (Polish Constitution. A commentary). Vol. II, Warszawa, 2001, 72.
29 See L. Garlicki’s comments on Art. 188 of Polish Constitution. In: Garlicki, L. (ed.): 
Konstytucja RP. Komentarz (Polish Constitution. A commentary). Vol. V, Warszawa, 2007, 14.
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as well. Consequently, the statute referred to in Art. 188 of the Constitution also means a 
Constitution-revising statute.30 It would indeed be hard to accept a situation where, in a 
democratic state ruled by law, the framers of the system of governance are not bound by the 
requirement of decent legislation within the area subject to Constitutional Court’s 
examination, while they are so bound in their capacity as legislators. And besides, it is only 
natural that the framers of the system of governance should act on the basis of law and 
within the bounds of the law. 
The interpretation of the provisions of the Preamble to the Polish Constitution may 
provide an instrument with which to defend Constitutional democracy’s axiological identity 
against potential threats from a majority susceptible to pressure from politicians and media. 
This line of defence may prove useful in avoiding a situation where the creators of public 
opinion (as reﬂ ected in the results of public opinion polls) will become the creators of 
Constitutional changes. The proposed interpretation reﬂ ects neither the position of doctrine 
of Constitutional law nor the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court which has had no 
reason to take up the question of limits to Constitutional change. The Polish Constitution, in 
its part phrased in articles, does not regard any provisions as unchangeable. Doctrine rules 
out the existence of unchangeable provisions in the Polish Constitution. It has been 
demonstrated, though, that there are restrictions on Constitutional change, stemming from 
Poland’s membership of the European Union.31 On the other hand, the importance of 
external factors, related to membership of the European Union, seems to be fairly limited 
by the Constitutional Court’s recognition of the primacy of the fundamental law over 
European law.
It is my opinion that the Polish Constitutional Preamble, in its closing part, contains a 
clause on the immutability of the Constitution. The formulation of this clause and 
identiﬁ cation of an internal benchmark on limits to Constitutional change leads us to the 
conclusion that the clause itself must be regarded as unchangeable−as long as there exists 
the world of values deﬁ ning the identity of a Constitutional culture in which it belongs.32 
The values in question−coessential to the constraint on authority due to the dignity of the 
person−have been present in European culture since the times of Homer and Sophocles. 
They have survived triumphs of violence, and they remain relevant despite manifestations 
of the “intelligence of evil”−and despite the ambivalence of all political forms connected 
with phenomena such as “voluntary enslavement” or “instinctive, suicidal ineffectiveness 
of systems of power”.33 The unshakeable Constitutional foundation, laid down in the 
Preamble, thus represents a steadfastness of values which constitutionalism accepts as an 
authority higher than the highest “powers that be”−an anchor for dignity of the person. At 
the same time, this unshakable nature makes of the Preamble a barrier to virtualisation, 
30 Cf. Sokolewicz: op. cit., who however argues that “from the very essence of a Constitutional-
revising statute it transpires that control must not be applied to the statute’s substantive provisions 
which by deﬁ nition have been designed to modify Constitutional provisions”. Similarly, L. Garlicki: 
ibid.
31 Cf. Garlicki, L.: Aksjologiczne podstawy reinterpretacji konstytucji (Axiological basis for 
reinterpretation of the Constitution). In: Zubik, M. (ed.): Dwadzieścia lat transformacji ustrojowej w 
Polsce (Twenty years of systemic transformation in Poland). Warszawa, 2010, 99.
32 Cf. Piotrowski: op. cit. 142.
33 Cf. Baudrillard, J.: Pakt jasności. O inteligencji zła (The Lucidity Pact, or The Intelligence of 
Evil). Warszawa, 2005, 136. 
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which poses a threat to the Constitution in the same degree as other contraptions of the 
social world, where “anything, any moment, can turn into anything else”.34
6. But the higher the frequency of principle- and value-invoking notions in the 
Constitutional text (usually in the Preamble), the greater and the more real is the authority 
of those who interpret these notions−and impart sense to them−in conditions of a particular 
constitutional dispute. This holds in particular for situations where, in particular 
circumstances of a particular case, the values declared in the Preamble stand in conﬂ ict 
among themselves, which requires that some of these values be either preferred over, or 
counter-balanced by, others. The judges empowered to interpret the Preamble, and also 
interpret the Constitution from the Preamble’s viewpoint, are thus awarded with the right of 
last word in particular political disputes−and they will hold this prerogative at least as long 
as the Constitution stays. This requires an appropriate restraint in invoking the Constitutional 
Preamble in Constitutional Court rulings and appropriate prudence in appointing the Justices 
of the Court, whose legitimacy stems from the special role of the Constitution under 
democracy and from the Constitutional Court’s mastery of the art of passing judgement on 
what is good and what is bad−in accordance with the maxim ius est ars boni et aequi. The 
existence of Preamble to the Constitution, and its application in Constitutional jurisprudence, 
is conducive to an inter-penetration of statutory-law culture and the culture of judge-
generated law−which is an element of the common Constitutional tradition of European 
countries. 
The transformations of the notion of national sovereignty, linked to its restriction by 
human rights, offer a great deal of legitimacy to the activities of the Constitutional Court 
which thus becomes a guardian of the limits to sovereignty, understood as exercise of 
authority based on the force of values referred to in the Preamble to the Polish 
Constitution−and simultaneously restricted by these values. Such re-deﬁ nition of the notion 
of sovereignty legitimises the activities of the Constitutional Court, and at the same time 
makes this legitimacy contingent on the Constitutional Court’s involvement in the protection 
of human rights−remembering that respect for human rights provides a yardstick of 
sovereignty.35
The impact exerted by the Preamble on the Polish Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction is 
both positive (from the standpoint of the tenets of constitutionalism) and restricted. The 
provisions of the Preamble proved useful for the purpose of legitimising the process of 
European integration and legitimising the public authorities because, when it comes to the 
application of the Constitution, the Preamble basically favours a balance between the realm 
of ideas and values on the one hand and the sphere of social practice on the other, between 
the need for change and the necessity of continuity in state affairs−and that, one might 
venture to suggest,36 is what constitutions are for.
34 Arendt, H.: Między czasem minionym i przyszłym (Between Past and Future). Warszawa, 
1994, 117. 
35 Cf. Piotrowski, R.: Uwagi o ustrojowym znaczeniu sądownictwa konstytucyjnego [Comments 
on the systemic importance of Constitutional courts]. In: Budziło, K. (ed.): Księga XXV-lecia 
Trybunału Konstytucyjnego (In commemoration of the 25th anniversary of Constitutional Court). 
Warszawa, 2010, 323.
36 Cf. Spadaro, A.: Contributo per una teoria della costituzione. Milano, 1994, 47.
